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Abstract:  
The proposal to tax the unrelated business income of charitable organisations was 
announced in the 2011 budget, but  the course of events has overtaken the stated 
policy rationale. We identify and discuss the policy for the imposition of the new tax 
and demonstrate that the measure is unnecessary given a recent judgement by the 
High Court, establishment of a new charity regulator and a better understanding of 
the applicable tax theory. 
Introduction 
As part of the 2011 federal Budget process, the government announced the introduction of 
what amounts to an unrelated business income tax (UBIT) on the income of not-for-profit 
(NFP) entities, to commence on 1 July 2011.1 A Treasury consultation paper about reforming 
the use of tax concessions by NFP entities was released in the following weeks.2 It broadly 
proposed that NFP entities pay tax on any retained earnings not annually remitted and 
applied to the purposes of the tax concession entity, and that existing input tax concessions 
(such as FBT and GST) would not be available for unrelated commercial activities.3 The 
inadequate information provided has created uncertainty and has had an adverse impact on 
a sector of the economy which generally operates with limited financial reserves to buffer 
financial shocks and which lacks experience in coping with retrospective taxing provisions.4  
A year later, uncertainty has only grown, with Treasury neither publishing the submissions in 
response to the consultation paper, nor publicly releasing draft legislation or a revised policy 
position for public comment. The government has postponed the commencement date to 1 
July 2012 to allow for more consultation.5 It still proposes that new “unrelated activities”, 
commencing from 7.30 pm (AEST) on 10 May 2011, will be affected. Unrelated activities 
begun before that date will be covered by transitional arrangements amounting to a phase-
out over an unspecified period.  
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While government is moving slowly, other events have overtaken the policy initiative. This 
article asks whether the reasons given for introducing the UBIT remain. The authors suggest 
that a combination of three factors, read together, have effectively addressed the concerns 
mounted as justifications for this tax. These three factors are:  
(1) an apparent retreat from the government’s position on recommendations of three 
government-initiated inquiries in relation to what is known as the “competitive neutrality 
argument”;  
(2) the anticipated powers and imminent commencement of the Australian Charities and 
Not-For-Profits Commission (ACNC); and 
(3) most importantly, the impact of the recent High Court decision in FCT v Bargwanna.6  
The article discusses how each of these developments addresses the three principal 
reasons given to justify the introduction of the UBIT. The competitive neutrality argument is 
addressed first. A brief comment is made on the function of this tax being not to raise 
revenue but to effect regulatory policy, and the article then discusses the intended regulator, 
the ACNC. An examination of the Bargwanna case closes the analysis. The predominant 
focus of the article is on the Bargwanna case because it is the new, final piece in the jigsaw; 
the authors suggest that it demonstrates that the regulatory and tax picture is complete 
without a UBIT. They conclude that, if their analysis is correct, it is not necessary for the 
federal government to proceed with the introduction of a UBIT.  
Level Playing Field 
In the first public indication that Australian charities might be subject to a UBIT, what is 
known as the competitive neutrality argument was put forward as its justification. It appeared 
in a statement made by Minister Shorten in his address to the Australian Council of Social 
Service in the lead-up to the 2011 Budget. He said:7 
“Many in this room may hold the view that such concessions are a reasonable way 
for Government offering indirect support for the community sector. But others would 
question whether the commercial operations of these entities are, in fact, charitable 
in nature. The Treasury boffins among us would also question the impacts of such 
policy upon the principle of competitive neutrality or, in laymen’s terms, whether there 
is a level playing field for like businesses if some benefit from tax concessions by 
virtue of their business associations.” 
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On this reading, the measure presents as being introduced to address policy concerns, not 
to raise revenue through taxation. To the policy issue of competitive neutrality, the then 
Assistant Treasurer and the Minister for Social Inclusion added a second concern that 
charitable assets might not be applied to charitable purposes. They stated in a Budget media 
release: “The Government’s reforms will encourage charities to direct profits generated by 
unrelated commercial activities back to their charity’s altruistic purposes.”8 The Minister 
subsequently expressed a concern to protect those assets from “unnecessary commercial 
risks”.9  
The third concern justifying the introduction of the UBIT — a fear of lost revenue — was 
introduced by Minister Shorten in a speech to the National Press Club on 27 May 2011.10 He 
began by summarising the first two reasons set out above:  
“A clear policy intent underpins this measure [the introduction of a UBIT]. 
It is designed to protect the integrity of the sector by ensuring that valuable tax 
concessions are utilised to further the altruistic aims of the sector, rather than being 
used to provide an uncompetitive advantage to a purely commercial activity. 
… 
This is not a revenue raising measure — you won't see a single dollar gained in the 
forward estimates as a result of this reform.” 
The Minister then added the third:10  
“But the Government has acted based on the strong advice of the Treasury and ATO 
that the loophole created by Word Investments posed a significant risk of exploitation 
and presents a risk to revenue for all levels of Government.”  
Following this address, on 27 May 2011, Treasury released a consultation paper titled 
“Better targeting of not-for-profit tax concessions”. Under the heading “policy intent”,11 this 
paper set out the first two of these factors; it also raised concerns arising out of the Word 
Investments case.12  
Whether the Word Investments case created a loophole is debatable.13 The assertion has 
been made, but there has not been a statement or document issued by Treasury or any 
other government department explaining where or how. The Word Investments case was 
decided on very similar facts to the famous Pemsel case14of 1891, so explanation is called 
for as to why, if there is a loophole, it has not existed for over a century. Third, and contrary 
to the statements of Minister Shorten, the 2012 Budget papers invite the understanding that 
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more than a single dollar of revenue may be expected from this reform. The forward 
estimates in the 2012 Budget papers have replaced the dash, signifying “nil” revenue in 
2011 Budget paper no. 2,15 with an asterisk, signifying “the nature of this measure is such 
that a reliable estimate cannot be provided”.16  
While these are important matters of significant concern in the sector, they are not the focus 
here. What is important for this article is to ask whether developments since the Assistant 
Treasurer’s speech have now addressed the three policy concerns said to provide the 
rationale for introducing the UBIT.  
Has the field Titled?In relation to competitive neutrality concerns, it appeared initially that the 
government accepted the reasons behind recommendations against introducing a UBIT, set 
out in the three inquiries that have considered this issue. The report of the Australia’s Future 
Tax System Review (Henry Review) stated: “The income tax and GST concessions 
generally do not appear to violate the principle of competitive neutrality where NFP 
organisations operate in commercial markets.”17 The Productivity Commission reported to 
the same effect, finding that “on balance, income tax exemptions are not significantly 
distortionary”.18 The Industry Commission reported in 1995 that “such exemptions were 
unlikely to provide an unfair advantage to NFPs”.19  
With the evidence not supporting the introduction of a UBIT on competitive neutrality 
grounds, no new evidence was presented in the better targeting consultation paper. Instead, 
Treasury stated: ‘These reforms will be implemented using a principles-based approach to 
tax law design, in accordance with the Government’s commitment to improve tax system 
governance.”20 However, the paper did not refer to any of the “A New Tax System 
Principles”.21 It also did not refer to difficulties experienced on a practical level with the UBIT 
in the United States, Canada or the United Kingdom, on which there is extensive evidence-
based literature.22 Reflection on the analysis in the three reports referred to above, along 
with practitioner and academic writing, may well have led the government to abandon the 
competitive neutrality argument. Whatever the government’s view, it is suggested that the 
analysis set out in the reports of the Industry Commission, the Productivity Commission and 
the Henry Review is compelling. 
Direct application 
Turning to the second concern, that a UBIT is necessary to “protect the integrity of the sector 
by ensuring that valuable tax concessions are utilised to further the altruistic aims of the 
sector”,10 this is essentially a concern that charitable assets might not be applied to 
charitable purposes. It is fundamentally a regulatory issue and not a tax concern, and 
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therefore can be dealt with more effectively, directly by a specialised regulator, as 
recommended by all recent inquiries and accepted by the federal government. The 
establishment of the ACNC is well advanced, and it is scheduled to commence formal 
operations on 1 October 2012.23 The draft establishment Bill provides for it to address 
directly issues such as fidelity of a charity’s activities to its stated mission, protection of 
assets, and adoption of appropriate risk management for investments — giving it specially 
crafted regulatory mechanisms which are not available to the ATO.24 The establishment of 
the ACNC therefore obviates the need for an indirect attempt at protection through 
amendment to tax legislation, which is an inferior means of achieving regulatory purposes, in 
both design and application. The ACNC offers modern light touch surgical regulation in 
comparison to blunt, compliance costly tax administration. If the UBIT was ever needed for 
regulatory purposes, it is now otiose.  
Bargwanna 
This article now discusses the government’s third concern, that “the loophole created by 
Word Investments posed a significant risk of exploitation and presents a risk to revenue for 
all levels of Government”.10 The nature of this concern has not been particularised, although 
it can take only one of two forms: either a charity retains its surpluses, or it parts with its 
surpluses in a manner contrary to the basis on which it is entitled to exemption. In this 
context, the recent Bargwanna case25 becomes important because, in its decision, the High 
Court seems to have closed the book on both of these concerns, at least in relation to 
charitable trusts — and by parity of reasoning, for charitable institutions generally. That 
decision makes it clear that a charity must not only pursue the charitable purposes set out in 
its trust deed, but it must always apply its charitable assets to its charitable purposes. The 
case itself involved the maladministration of trust funds, but the High Court also commented 
on the circumstances which might justify the accumulation of surpluses,26 effectively giving 
the Commissioner of Taxation everything he asked for. The result is clear guidance, 
consistent with the Commissioner’s understanding of the law, issued from the High Court of 
Australia. The authors suggest that this decision allays any residual concerns that could 
justify a UBIT. 
In the case, Mr and Mrs Bargwanna were trustees of a charitable trust that was substantially 
administered in accordance with the terms of the trust; but there was also significant 
maladministration. Importantly for the purpose of this discussion, the maladministration 
involved both the admixture of trust funds with personal funds and the receipt of personal 
benefit by Mr and Mrs Bargwanna. The Commissioner of Taxation refused to endorse the 
trust as an income tax-exempt charity. In his view, the maladministration meant that the fund 
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was not “applied for the purposes for which it was established” as required by s 50-60 of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (ITAA97). The Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
found27 “that there was no evidence that [Mr and Mrs Bargwanna]’, as trustees of the Trust, 
authorised, condoned, suspected or even contemplated ‘the kinds of accounting 
irregularities the evidence revealed” and decided in their favour. The Federal Court 
disagreed,28 deciding for the Commissioner but, in turn, that decision was overturned by the 
Full Court of the Federal Court.29  
By a unanimous decision, the High Court overruled the Full Federal Court. It accepted all of 
the submissions of the Commissioner of Taxation and decided in his favour. In so doing, it 
decided that, while it is the case that “general law favours the advancement of charitable 
purposes in various respects”, that principle does not carry across to “some special rule of 
construction of the revenue law” that gives trustees of charitable trusts some advantage 
under the ITAA97.30 The court pointed out that it has “‘long been established that a provision 
in a will or settlement for the ‘application’ of moneys to a designated end requires that the 
moneys be devoted to or employed for that special purpose”.31 Before the High Court, the 
Commissioner conceded and, in the court’s view, quite correctly “that not all acts or 
omissions giving rise to maladministration of a trust for charitable purposes will have the 
result of denying entitlement to exemption”.32 The court gave two examples of such non-fatal 
maladministration: the making of “an unauthorised investment” and minor breaches that are 
“de minimis misapplications” of trust funds.  
The High Court expressly rejected the argument that income tax exemption should be 
extended to trusts where a trustee “may have been able to obtain absolution [under state 
law] as having acted honestly and reasonably”.32 In the context of revenue law, it seems 
clear now that any breaches of a charitable trust, other than those that are minor or perhaps 
involve an unauthorised investment, are grounds for the Commissioner to deny tax 
concession charity status.  
The High Court did not limit itself to this question when clarifying the law. Discussing the 
history of the matter, the court considered an argument which the Commissioner had put 
“unsuccessfully” to the AAT, but which was “not renewed” in the High Court.33 Before the 
AAT, the Commissioner had submitted an argument similar to that in Trustees, Executors 
and Agency Co Ltd v Acting FCT34 in which “the Commissioner submitted the fund was not 
so applied if the income was being accumulated rather than expended for charitable 
purposes”.35 The High Court noted that the “Commissioner now accepts that a fund may be 
‘applied’ for charitable purposes without immediate expenditure of income as it is derived”.33 
With this concession, it fell to the High Court to clarify “what is required for due 
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administration of the trust”33 in the context of accumulation of surpluses, indicating that a 
purpose for accumulation may be required. The High Court referred to an example from 
Trustees, Executors and Agency Co36 of a trust that required £20,000 to purchase 
something in pursuit of its charitable purpose but could only obtain £5,000 a year. Clearly, in 
that case, accumulation of £5,000 per year for four years was appropriate. In making such 
accumulations, the trustees would be applying the funds to the charitable purpose. In this 
context, the High Court found that there is an “elasticity” appropriately extended to trustees 
in forming views as to how they go about discharging their trust’s charitable purposes. In that 
context, the High Court made it clear though, by reference to a superannuation trust 
decision, that, if trust funds were applied to private purposes, it would be a breach of trust, 
not the application of the principle of “elasticity”.37 
Post Bargwanna 
Following Bargwanna, if it had been thought that there was opportunity for private individuals 
to “exploit” the charitable exemption provisions of the ITAA97 to obtain private benefits, that 
door is now closed. If there had been a concern that trustees of charitable trusts might 
accumulate surpluses (perhaps to apply them to business, rather than charitable purposes) 
without regard to the obligation to apply charitable assets to charitable purposes, this case 
has made it clear that trustees may not do so. The recurrent theme through the judgment is 
that trustees of charitable trusts must apply all charitable assets to the charitable purposes 
for which they are held.  
The Bargwanna case has strengthened the Commissioner’s hand to deny tax concession 
charity status for all but the most minor breaches of charitable trusts. Furthermore, under the 
present law, and as the High Court pointed out, power lies with the Commissioner to be 
satisfied as to whether there is a proper application of charitable funds.38 
We must now ask: if the Commissioner of Taxation has power to deny income tax exemption 
in situations where funds are applied to personal purposes, mixed with other funds, or 
accumulated in a manner inconsistent with the charitable purpose, is there any reason to 
introduce a UBIT? If the answer is “no”, there remains no justification for the introduction of a 
UBIT, since there cannot be “a loophole” to be closed. The High Court has closed it with its 
Bargwanna decision by deciding every issue in favour of the Commissioner of Taxation. 
Conclusion 
This article has made out a case that the government could remove the UBIT from its reform 
agenda. It is a tax that has been expressly rejected by the three independent inquiries that 
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have considered it on competitive neutrality grounds. It has been problematic overseas. If its 
purpose was regulatory, that purpose will be achieved directly and more efficiently, for 
government and the sector, through the ACNC. If the concern was that the Commissioner of 
Taxation did not have power to close a “loophole” by denying exemption where he was 
concerned about the application of charitable funds, the High Court has assured him of that 
power. Further, it has made it clear that the common law does not permit misappropriation.  
It follows that, if the grounds for the three concerns justifying the introduction of the UBIT 
have been addressed by other means, the time has come for the UBIT to be abandoned. 
There is much anxiety about its introduction in the charity sector since it was announced 
over a year ago. There is distortion of behaviour now arising because of the uncertainty. This 
is affecting charity beneficiaries who are least able to afford such disruptions at this time of 
economic crisis. Australia could, and should, be providing international leadership through 
this reform agenda. Instead, we are ignoring sound arguments and recommendations in 
reports of our own inquiries; and the evidence of overseas jurisdictions demonstrating the 
futility of introducing a UBIT. The bank of goodwill accompanying the National Compact 
process is being spent in unnecessary disputation. Charitable resources are being diverted 
from the frontline of service delivery into tax planning. If the reasoning set out in this article is 
sound, then the UBIT should be abandoned.  
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